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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT 
OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                    
NO. 06-2756
                    
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
VERNON DOUGLAS
a/k/a LEVERNE DOUGLAS
a/k/a SPIDER
Vernon Douglas,
                Appellant
                    
On Appeal From the United States District Court 
For the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Crim. Action No. 05-cr-00038)
District Judge:  Hon. R. Barclay Surrick
                   
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
June 14, 2007
BEFORE:  McKEE, STAPLETON and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed:   July 3, 2007)
                    
                    
2OPINION OF THE COURT
                    
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge:
After a jury trial in September 2005 in the District Court, a jury convicted Vernon
Douglas of one count of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime,
18 U.S.C. § 924(c).  The jury also convicted him of the other four crimes with which he
was charged: three violations of the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1),
(b)(1)(C), 844, and one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(1).
On May 18, 2006, the District Court sentenced Douglas to life imprisonment for
his conviction of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime.  The
District Court ordered that sentence to run concurrently with the sentences it imposed for
the other four counts, which ranged from 12 to 240 months.
Douglas appeals from his sentence.  We have jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. §
3742(a), and we will vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing in light of our
decisions in United States v. King, 454 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2006) and United States v.
Colon, 474 F.3d 95 (3d Cir. 2007).
I
Before the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220
3(2005) rendered the United States Sentencing Guidelines advisory, a District Court’s
power to sentence a defendant outside of the range supplied by the Guidelines was limited
by the provisions of the Guidelines pertaining to “departures.”  After Booker, we now
require that the District Court undertake a three-step process in imposing a sentence.  The
District Court must: (1) calculate the applicable Guidelines range, (2) formally rule on
any departure motions, and (3) exercise its post-Booker discretion, considering the factors
set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).  United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237, 247 (3d Cir.
2006).
In this case, at “step 1,” the District Court calculated the advisory Guidelines
sentence range to be 93 to 101 months.  The Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”)
recommends that range, PSR at 10, and the minute entry following the sentencing hearing
reflects that the District Court overruled both Douglas’s and the government’s objections
to the PSR.  On this record, however, it is not clear to us how much of the difference
between the advisory Guidelines range and the ultimate sentence was imposed as a
departure at “step 2,” and how much was imposed as what we have called a
Booker “variance” at “step 3.”  The parties briefed and argued both issues, and the
transcript of the sentencing hearing indicates that the District Court based the ultimate
sentence to some extent on both.
Douglas suggests that his sentence was based, at least in part, on an upward
departure under § 4A1.3 of the Guidelines, which provides that “[i]f reliable information
indicates that the defendant’s criminal history category substantially under-represents the
4seriousness of the defendant’s crimes and the likelihood that the defendant will commit
other crimes, an upward departure may be warranted.”  Douglas goes on to argue that, if
the District Court based his sentence on § 4A1.3, then it failed to follow the proper
procedure in doing so, and he is therefore entitled to a remand for resentencing.  The
government concedes that it is not clear from the record to what extent Douglas’s
sentence was the product of an upward departure under the Guidelines (“step 2”) or an
upward “variance” under the District Court’s post-Booker discretion (“step 3”), and joins
Douglas in recommending a remand.  Although the Government’s concession does not
relieve us of our independent duty to evaluate Douglas’s arguments, see United States v.
Vargas-Garcia, 434 F.3d 345, 348 (5th Cir. 2005) (affirming the challenged sentence,
despite the government’s concession that it was erroneous); United States v. Resendiz-
Patino, 420 F.3d 1177, 1182-83 (10th Cir. 2005) (same), we agree with both parties that a
remand is appropriate in this case.
II 
Our pre-Booker precedents hold that, when a District Court imposes an upward
departure under § 4A1.3 of the Guidelines, it must do so according to a “ratcheting”
procedure, by which the District Court looks within the Guidelines to determine which
higher criminal history category best represents the seriousness of the defendant’s crimes
and the likelihood that the defendant will commit other crimes.  United States v.
Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084, 1111-12 (3d Cir. 1990).  Moreover, the District Court “is
obliged to proceed sequentially through the categories, [and] may not move to the next
5higher category until it has found that the prior category still fails to adequately reflect the
seriousness of the defendant’s conduct.”  United States v. Hickman, 991 F.2d 1110, 1114
(3d Cir. 1993).  In Kikumura, we explained that the principle underlying the ratcheting
approach is that “that the appropriate length of a sentence should be determined from the
sentencing table, even outside the context of straightforward applications of underlying
offense and offender guidelines,” and that “the power to depart is not the power to throw
away the guidelines in favor of any sentence that strikes the judge as reasonable.”  918
F.2d at 1112 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  Thus, before Booker, if a
District Court imposed a departure under § 4A1.3 without following the ratcheting
procedure, we would vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing.  See, e.g., United
States v. Freeman, 316 F.3d 386, 390-91 (3d Cir. 2003); United States v. Cicirello, 301
F.3d 135 (3d Cir. 2002); United States v. Harris, 44 F.3d 1206, 1212-13 (3d Cir. 1995).
Although the Supreme Court’s decision in Booker cast doubt on the continued
viability of the principle underlying Kikumura and Hickman, we held in King that District
Courts must still follow the ratcheting procedure when imposing upward departures under
§ 4A1.3.  454 F.3d at 195-96.
In United States v. Colon, 474 F.3d 95 (3d Cir. 2007) we added that “[a] district
court need not rely on upward departures to sentence a defendant above the recommended
guidelines range.”  As we explained in that case:
When imposing such a sentence, a district court need only state on the
record what factors it is considering.  Inasmuch as we do not require any
formulaic statement of reasons for imposing the final sentence, we will
6uphold an above-the-guidelines sentence so long as it is reasonable and the
district court’s statement of reasons supports it.  Therefore, if a district court
is sentencing above the guidelines range, as it did in this case, based on the
section 3553(a) factors without granting a departure from the guidelines
range, it is not bound by the ratcheting procedures we set forth in Kikumura
and Hickman.
Id. at 99 (emphasis added).  In Colon, however, it was clear from the record that the
District Court’s decision to sentence above the Guidelines range was based entirely on an
exercise of its post-Booker discretion, made at Gunter “step 3.”  In a footnote, the Colon
panel added that the District Court “would have been required to use the ratcheting
procedure if it had made a traditional departure from the guidelines at step two in the
three-step process as noted in [Gunter].”  Id. at 99-100 n.8.
III
On this record, it is not clear to us to what extent the District Court’s ultimate
sentence was based on an upward departure under § 4A1.3 of the Guidelines and to what
extent it was based on a Booker “variance.”  For this reason, we will remand for
resentencing.  As we held in King and Colon, to the extent that the District Court
sentences above the Guidelines based on an upward departure under § 4A1.3, it must
follow the ratcheting procedure in Kikumura and Hickman.  While that procedure “does
not require the district court to go through a ritualistic exercise in which it mechanically
discusses each criminal history category it rejects en route to the category it selects,” it
does require “that the district court’s reasons for rejecting each lower category be clear
from the record as a whole.”  Harris, 44 F.3d at 1212.  To the extent that the District
7Court sentences above the Guidelines based on a Booker variance, the ultimate sentence
must be reasonable, and the District Court should explain its reasons for the ultimate
sentence with reference to the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).  See Colon, 474
F.3d at 100;  King, 454 F.3d at 196.
We do not fault the District Court in this case, as the Supreme Court’s decision in
Booker cast doubt on the continued relevance of Guidelines-based departures, and King,
Gunter, and Colon were all decided after the District Court imposed Douglas’s sentence. 
Our precedents following Booker hold, however, that the Guidelines remain the starting
point for the sentencing analysis, that departures imposed under § 4A1.3 must still follow
the ratcheting procedure, and that the record should make clear both the reasons
supporting the ultimate sentence and the extent to which the sentence imposed is based on
the initial Guidelines calculation, on a departure under the Guidelines, and on a Booker
variance.  See, e.g., United States v. Vampire Nation, 451 F.3d 189, 198 (3d Cir. 2006)
(“[D]istrict courts should be careful to articulate whether a sentence is a departure or a
variance from the Guidelines range.”). 
IV
For the reasons set forth above, we will vacate Douglas’s sentence and remand for
resentencing in light of King and Colon.  Because we will vacate Douglas’s sentence, it
unnecessary for us to address his other objections to the sentence.
